

Political Economy of International Trade

POSC 214 | Spring 2026 | Wed. 4:00 – 6:50 PM | Classroom: WAT 2145

Steven Liao

Syllabus Version: March 31, 2026

Contact Information

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Office Hours

Wednesday

11 AM – 1 PM

(Email to set up Zoom/in-person meeting)

Description

This course is a PhD-level introduction to the International Political Economy (IPE) of trade. The course's primary objective is to teach students to conduct original research on IPE-related topics. To that end, the course covers fundamental theories and also reviews cutting-edge research. The course is organized by substantive topic area. The first half of the course covers sources of trade policy preferences, preference aggregation by domestic institutions, electoral consequences, and interstate cooperation and competition in trade. The remainder of the course covers topics related to global production, focusing on multinational corporations, foreign direct investment, and global value chains. Overall, the course covers the most prominent areas of IPE research in trade, leaving other equally interesting topics for students to pursue in different courses and independently in their research projects.

Prerequisite

Students are expected to have taken (or be concurrently taking) introductory methods courses and have a basic familiarity with economics (at the level of an undergraduate introductory economics course). Even with this background students will encounter unfamiliar economic concepts and are encouraged to consult an international economic textbook for clarification. Recommended references on basic international economics:

Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, Marc J. Melitz. 2022. *International Economics: Theory and Policy*. Pearson Education.

Requirements and Evaluation

Research Design Paper (50%), Presentation (10%), Comments (10%)

This is the most important component of the course. The goal is to help students develop a proposal that can lead to a high-quality publishable paper.

- Each student will write one 6-8 page (double-spaced) paper, due on *June 10 (11:59 PM)*. The paper needs to clearly and concisely articulate an original research question, synthesize

existing related research, present theoretically grounded testable hypotheses, describe plausible empirical strategies, and show some preliminary data. When writing the paper, you should constantly ask yourself the following questions: Who is your audience? Why should they care? Can your project convince them to change their way of thinking?

- Beginning in Session 5, each student will receive 30 minutes of class time to discuss their proposal. Prior to the presentation, the presenter will circulate a draft proposal. The proposal needs to be posted in Canvas by *the Friday (11:59 PM) before the presentation*. Students will prepare a formal 15-minute presentation of their project, and class members will ask questions and give feedback for the remainder of the time.
- To ensure presenters receive adequate feedback, each student will provide written comments (around one page long; bullet points are fine) to *two* presenters over the course. The comments should be posted in Canvas by *the Monday (11:59 PM) before presentations*.

Critical Review Papers (10% each)

Each student will complete two critical review papers (4-page double-spaced). Papers should be posted in Canvas by *the Monday (11:59 PM) before class*. The papers should synthesize readings within weeks, distilling them into their main arguments and findings, as well as across weeks. Importantly, they will also identify shortcomings and omissions and give constructive suggestions for how to improve the literature. You may choose which weeks to write papers with the condition that at least one paper must be written by Session 5.

Participation (10%)

In addition to seminar participation, each student will lead/co-lead one seminar discussion during the course. The discussion leader(s) will circulate a least three discussion questions that draw out significant unifying themes among the readings and/or contrast with previous weeks. Again, discussion questions should be posted in Canvas by *the Monday (11:59 PM) before class*.

We will coordinate presentation slots, critical review papers, and discussion leaderships during the first session.

Readings

All readings are available online through standard online journal databases unless otherwise noted.

Non-Discrimination Policy

The ultimate goal of this seminar is to use it as an opportunity to help each other improve their research. All participants should treat each other with respect. Comments and feedback should always be constructive. I will not tolerate any discriminatory speech or behavior.

Accommodation

Every effort will be made to accommodate students with disabilities. Please contact me as early as possible about your needs, and I will treat the matter confidentially, within university policy,

and with the resources provided by Student Special Services (<http://specialservices.ucr.edu/disabilities/>).

Meeting and Reading Schedule

Session 1: Introduction (April 1)

Required:

Lake, David. 2009. “[Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review](#).” *The Review of International Organizations* 4(3): 219–44.

Optional:

Frieden, Jeffrey, and Lisa Martin. 2002. “[International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions](#).” In *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner. 118-46. New York: W.W. Norton.

Cohen, Benjamin J. 2008. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Oatley, Thomas. 2011. “[The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy](#),” *International Organization* 65(2): 311–41.

Session 2: Sources of Trade Policy Preferences (April 8)

Required:

Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. “[Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety](#).” *International Organization* 63(3): 425–457.

Johnston, Noel, and Erica Owen. 2017. “[Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability and Protectionist Sentiment](#).” *International Organization* 71(4): 665–699.

Lee, Haillie Na-Kyung and Yu-Ming Loiu. 2022. “[Where You Work Is Where You Stand: A Firm-Based Framework for Understanding Trade Opinion](#).” *International Organization* 76(3):713–740.

Rho, Sungmin, and Michael Tomz. 2017. “[Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?](#)” *International Organization* 71(S1): S85–S108.

Optional:

Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. 2006. “[Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade](#)”. *International Organization*, 60(2), 469–498.

Naoui, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2011. “[Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment During the Global Recession](#).” *International Organization* 65(04): 771–795.

- Lu, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2012. “[Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection](#).” *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3)July, 638–654.
- Ahlquist, John S., Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi. 2014. “[Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, and the ILWU Puzzle](#).” *International Organization* 68(01): 33–75.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2017. [American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics](#). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Mutz, Diana, and Eunji Kim. 2017. “[The Impact of In-group Favoritism on Trade Preferences](#).” *International Organization*, 71(4), 827–850.
- Schaffer, Lena Maria, and Gabriele Spilker. 2019. “[Self-Interest Versus Sociotropic considerations: An Information-based Perspective to Understanding Individuals’ Trade Preferences](#).” *Review of International Political Economy*, 26:6, 1266–1292.
- Jamal, Amaney, and Helen V. Milner. 2019. “[Economic Self-Interest, Information, and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence From an Experiment in Tunisia](#).” *Review of International Political Economy*, 26:4, 545–572.
- Brutger, Ryan, and Brian Rathbun. 2021. “[Fair Share? Equality and Equity in American Attitudes Toward Trade](#).” *International Organization*, 75(3), 880–900.
- Yeung, Eddy S.F., and Quek Kai. 2022. “[Relative Gains in the Shadow of a Trade War](#).” *International Organization* 76(3):741–765.
- Carnegie, Allison, and Nikhar Gaikwad. 2022. “[Public Opinion on Geopolitics and Trade: Theory and Evidence](#).” *World Politics* 74(2): 167–204.
- Menéndez González, Irene, Owen, Erica, and Walter, Stefanie. 2023. “[Low-Skill Products by High-Skill Workers: The Distributive Effects of Trade in Emerging and Developing Countries](#).” *Comparative Political Studies* 56(11):1724–1759.
- Menon, Anil, and Iain Osgood. 2024. “[The Wrong Winners: Anti-Corporate Animus and Attitudes Towards Trade](#).” *British Journal of Political Science* 54(4): 1180–1197.
- Lobo, Daniel, and Ryan Brutger. 2025. “[Fairness According to Whom? Divergent Perceptions of Fairness among White and Black Americans and Its Effect on Trade Attitudes](#).” *American Political Science Review*: 1–14.

Session 3: Domestic Interests and Trade Policy (April 15)

Required:

- Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. “[Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation](#).” *American Political Science Review* 96(03): 593–608.
- Kim, In Song. 2017. “[Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm Level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization](#).” *American Political Science Review* 111(01): 1–20.
- Blanchard, Emily J., and Xenia Matschke. 2015. “[U.S. Multinationals and Preferential Market Access](#).” *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 97(4):839–854.

Thrall, Matthew. 2025. “[Informational Lobbying and Commercial Diplomacy.](#)” *American Journal of Political Science* 69: 1147–1162.

Optional:

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “[Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade.](#)” *The American Political Science Review* 81(4): 1121–1137.

Alt, James E., and Michael Gilligan. 1994. “[The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions.](#)” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2 (2):165–192.

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. “[Protection for Sale.](#)” *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833–50.

Autor, David H., Frank Levy, and Richard J. Murnane. 2003. “[The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration.](#)” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 118 (4): 1279–1333.

Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, and Nina Pavcnik. 2007. “[Distributional Effects of Globalization in Developing Countries.](#)” *Journal of Economic Literature* 45(1): 39–82.

Helpman, Elhanan, Oleg Itskhoki, and Stephen Redding. 2010. “[Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy.](#)” *Econometrica* 78(4): 1239–83.

Imai, Kosuke, and Dustin Tingley. 2012. “[A Statistical Method for Empirical Testing of Competing Theories.](#)” *American Journal of Political Science* 56: 218–236.

Baccini, Leonardo, Pablo M. Pinto and Stephen Weymouth. 2017. “[The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence.](#)” *International Organization* 71(2):373–395.

Kim, In Song, and Iain Osgood. 2019. “[Firms in Trade and Trade Politics.](#)” *Annual Review of Political Science* 22(1): 399–417

Zeng, Ka, Karen Sebold and Yue Lu. 2020. “[Global Value Chains and Corporate Lobbying for Trade Liberalization.](#)” *The Review of International Organizations* 15(2):409–443.

Lee, Jieun. 2023. “[Foreign Direct Investment in Political Influence.](#)” *International Studies Quarterly* 67(1):sqad005.

Betz, Timm, David Fortunato, and Diana Z. O’Brien. 2023. “[Do Women Make More Protectionist Trade Policy?](#)” *American Political Science Review* 117(4):1522–1530.

Lee, Jieun, and Jan Stuckatz. 2024. “[Mobilization and Strategies: Comparing Trade Lobbying in the U.S. and Canada.](#)” *Comparative Political Studies* 57(2): 287–320.

Session 4: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy (April 22)

Required:

Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. “[Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.](#)” *American Political Science Review* 100(03): 369–84.

Gawande, Kishore, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2009. “What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade.” *International Organization* 63(03): 491–532.

Betz, Timm. 2017. “Trading Interests: Domestic Institutions, International Negotiations, and the Politics of Trade.” *The Journal of Politics* 79(4), 1237–1252.

Kim, In Song, Megumi Naoi, and Tomoya Sasaki. 2025. “Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization.” *American Political Science Review* 1–17.

Optional:

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade.” *World Politics* 49(3): 309–38.

Lohmann, Susanne, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1994. “Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence.” *International Organization* 48(04): 595–632.

Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization.” *International Organization* 53(04): 669–98.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 94 (2): 305–21.

Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 59(1): 107–143.

Milner, Helen V., and Bumba Mukherjee. 2009. “Democratization and Economic Globalization.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (1): 163–81.

Betz, Timm and Amy Pond. 2019. “The Absence of Consumer Interests in Trade Policy.” *The Journal of Politics* 81(2): 585–600.

Casler, Don, Matthew Connelly, and Raymond Hicks. 2024. “Trading with Frenemies: How Economic Diplomacy Affects Exports.” *International Studies Quarterly* 68(3): sqae098.

Session 5: Trade and Elections (April 29)

Required:

Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2017. “Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting.” *International Organization* 71(3), 423–457.

Autor, David H., David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2020. “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure.” *American Economic Review* 110(10), 3139–83.

Jares, Jake Alton, and Neil Malhotra. 2025. “Policy Impact and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Farmers’ Trade War Experiences.” *American Political Science Review* 119(2): 847–869.

Optional:

Margalit, Yotam. 2011. “Costly Jobs: Trade-Related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections.” *American Political Science Review* 105(01): 166–188.

Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” *American Economic Review* 103(6): 2121–2168.

Owen, Erica. 2019. “Foreign Direct Investment and Elections: The Impact of Greenfield FDI on Incumbent Party Reelection in Brazil.” *Comparative Political Studies* 52(4): 613–645.

Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth. 2021. “Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash.” *International Organization* 75(2):464–494.

Kim, Sung Eun, and Yotam Margalit. 2021. “Tariffs As Electoral Weapons: The Political Geography of the US-China Trade War.” *International Organization*, 75(1), 1–38.

Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Allison Carnegie, and Bryan Schoenfeld. 2023. “The Geography of Democratic Discontent.” *British Journal of Political Science* 53(2): 366–386.

Session 6: International Institutions and Trade Cooperation (May 6)

Required:

Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade.” *International Organization* 61(01): 37–67.

Lauren Peritz. 2020. “When are International Institutions Effective? The Impact of Domestic Veto Players on Compliance with WTO Rulings.” *International Studies Quarterly*, 64(1):220–234.

Brutger, Ryan. 2023. “Litigation for Sale: Private Firms and WTO Dispute Escalation.” *American Political Science Review*. 1–18.

Optional:

Davis, Christina L. 2004. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization.” *American Political Science Review* 98(1):153–169.

Baccini, Leonardo. 2010. “Explaining Formation and Design of EU Trade Agreements: The Role of Transparency and Flexibility.” *European Union Politics* 11(2): 195–217.

Christina L. Davis. 2012. *Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Davis, Christina L. 2023. *Discriminatory Clubs: The Geopolitics of International Organizations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Yeling Tan and Christina L. Davis. 2023. “The Limits of Liberalization: WTO Entry and Chinese State-Owned Firms.” *International Studies Quarterly* 67(3): squad056.

Carnegie, Allison, Richard Clark, and Ayse Kaya. 2024. “Private Participation: How Populists Engage with International Organizations.” *Journal of Politics* 86(3): 877–891.

Postnikov, Evgeny, and Jonas Gamso. 2025. “The Design of Autocratic Trade Agreements: Economic Integration and Political Survival.” *International Studies Quarterly* 69(1): sqae152.

Session 7: The Effects of Trade Competition (May 13)

Required:

Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000.” *International Organization* 60(04): 811–46.

Chatagnier, J. Tyson, and Kerim Can Kavaklı. 2017. “From Economic Competition to Military Combat: Export Similarity and International Conflict.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(7): 1510–1536.

Kim, In Song, Steven Liao, and Kosuke Imai. 2020. “Measuring Trade Profile with Granular Product-level Data.” *American Journal of Political Science* 64(1): 102–117.

Optional:

Cao, Xun, and Aseem Prakash. 2012. “Trade Competition and Environmental Regulations: Domestic Political Constraints and Issue Visibility.” *The Journal of Politics* 74(01): 66–82.

Cao, Xun, and Aseem Prakash. 2010. “Trade Competition and Domestic Pollution: A Panel Study, 1980–2003.” *International Organization* 64(03): 481–503.

Greenhill, Brian, Layna Mosley, and Aseem Prakash. 2009. “Trade-based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986–2002.” *American Political Science Review* 103(04): 669–690.

Session 8: Economics of Global Production (May 20)

Background:

Baldwin, Richard. 2016. “The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization.” Introduction. p. 1–15.

Required:

Bernard, Andrew B., J Bradford Jensen, Stephen J. Redding and Peter K. Schott. 2007. “Firms in International Trade.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 21(3): 105–130.

Fort, Teresa C. 2023. “The Changing Firm and Country Boundaries of US Manufacturers in Global Value Chains.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 37 (3): 31–58.

Antràs, Pol and Stephen R. Yeaple. 2014. “Multinational Firms and the Structure of International Trade” *Handbook of International Economics* 4: 55–130

Optional:

Helpman, Elhanan. 2006. “Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms.” *Journal of Economic Literature* 44(3): 589–630.

Nunn, Nathan. 2007. “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122 (2): 569–600.

- Alfaro, Laura, and Andrew Charlton. 2009. “[Intra-Industry Foreign Direct Investment.](#)” *The American Economic Review* 99(5): 2096–2119.
- Pandya, Sonal S. 2010. “[Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment.](#)” *International Organization*, 64(3), 389–409.
- Oldenski, Lindsay. 2012. “[Export Versus FDI and the Communication of Complex Information.](#)” *Journal of International Economics* 87(2): 312–22.
- Nunn, Nathan, and Daniel Trefler. 2013. “[Incomplete Contracts and the Boundaries of the Multinational Firm.](#)” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 94: 330–44.
- Alfaro, Laura, and Andrew Charlton. 2013. “[Growth and the Quality of Foreign Direct Investment: Is All FDI Equal?](#)” In *The Industrial Policy Revolution I: The Role of Government Beyond Ideology*, edited by Joseph E. Stiglitz and Justin Lin Yifu. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 162–204.
- Laura Alfaro. 2014. “[Foreign Direct Investment: Effects, Complementarities and Promotion.](#)” *Harvard Business School Working Paper* 15-006 (August).
- Hart, Oliver. 2017. “[Incomplete Contracts and Control.](#)” *American Economic Review* 107(7): 1731–1752.

Session 9: FDI and Political Risks (May 27)

Required:

- Pandya, Sonal S. 2014. “[Democratization and Foreign Direct Investment Liberalization, 1970–2000.](#)” *International Studies Quarterly* 58(3): 475–88.
- Johns, Leslie and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2016. “[Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment.](#)” *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 31–51.
- Wellhausen, Rachel L., Boliang Zhu. “[Exiting Russia.](#)” *American Political Science Review*: 1–18.

Optional:

- Vernon, Raymond. 1971. “[Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises.](#)” *The International Executive* 13(4):1–3.
- Kobrin, Stephen J. 1987. “[Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries.](#)” *International Organization* 41(04):609-638.
- Henisz, W. 2000. “[The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment.](#)” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 16(2): 334–64.
- Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. 2003. “[Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.](#)” *International Organization* 57(01): 175–211.
- Jensen, Nathan M. 2003. “[Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.](#)” *International Organization* 57(03): 587–616.

Wellhausen, Rachel L. 2015. [The Shield of Nationality](#). Cambridge University Press.

Pandya, Sonal and David Leblang. 2017. [“Risky Business: Institutions vs. Social Networks in FDI.”](#) *Economics & Politics* 29(2): 91–117.

Andrews, Sarah, David Leblang and Sonal S. Pandya. 2018. [“Ethnocentrism Reduces Foreign Direct Investment.”](#) *The Journal of Politics* 80:697–700.

Danzman, Sarah Bauerle. 2019. [Merging Interests: When Domestic Firms Shape FDI Policy](#). Cambridge University Press.

Jung, Yoo Sun, Erica Owen, and Gyu Sang Shim. 2021. [“Heterogeneity in How Investors Respond to Disputes: Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment and Coindustrial Disputes.”](#) *The Journal of Politics* 83:4:1260–1274

Zeng, Ka, and Soo Yeon Kim. 2025. [“Chinese Firms in the US–China Trade War: Decoupling through Reshoring?”](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 69(1): sqae117.

Session 10: Global Value Chains and Trade Policy (June 3)

Required:

Manger, Mark S. 2012. [“Vertical Trade Specialization and the Formation of North-South PTAs.”](#) *World Politics* 64(04): 622–58.

Anderer, Christina, Andreas Dür and Lisa Lechner. 2020. [“Trade Policy in a GVC World: Multinational Corporations and Trade Liberalization.”](#) *Business and Politics* 22(4): 1–28.

Kim, In Song, Steven Liao, and Sayumi Miyano. 2025. [“How FDI Reshapes Host Markets’ Trade Profile and Politics.”](#) *American Journal of Political Science*: 1–18.

Optional:

Büthe, Tim and Helen V. Milner. 2008. [“The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?”](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):741–762.

Meckling, Jonas and Llewelyn Hughes. 2017. [“Globalizing Solar: Global Supply Chains and Trade Preferences.”](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 61(2):225–235.

Osgood, Iain. 2018. [“Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements.”](#) *International Organization* 72(2):455–484.

Bown, Chad, Paola Conconi, Aksel Erbahar and Lorenzo Trimarchi. 2020. [“Trade Protection along Supply Chains.”](#) *Working Paper*.

Cory, Jared, Michael Lerner and Iain Osgood. 2021. [“Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition.”](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 65(1): 69–87.

Blanchard, Emily J., Chad P. Bown and Robert C. Johnson. 2023. [“Global Supply Chains and Trade Policy.”](#) *Working Paper*.

Session 11: Final Exams (June 10)

Research design paper due by 11:59 PM.

Additional Topics

Offshoring and Trade Politics

Required:

Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2013. “US versus Them: Mass Attitudes toward Offshore Outsourcing.” *World Politics* 65(04): 571–608.

Owen, Erica. 2017. “Exposure to Offshoring and the Politics of Trade Liberalization: Debate and Votes on Free Trade Agreements in the US House of Representatives, 2001–2006.” *International Studies Quarterly* 61(2): 297–311,

Rickard, Stephanie J. 2022. “Incumbents Beware: The Impact of Offshoring on Elections.” *British Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 758–780.

Optional:

Scheve, Kenneth, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 662–74.

Grossman, Gene, and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. 2006. “The Rise of Offshoring: It’s Not Wine for Cloth Anymore.” *The New Economic Geography: Effects and Policy Implications*, Jackson Hole Conference Volume, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Blinder, Alan. 2009. “Offshoring: Big Deal, or Business as Usual?” In *Offshoring of American Jobs: What Response from U.S. Economic Policy?*, ed. Benjamin Friedman. Cambridge University Press, 19–59.

Oldenski, Lindsay. 2012. “The Task Composition of Offshoring by U.S. Multinationals.” *International Economics* 131: 5–21.

Grossman, Gene M., and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. 2008. “Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory of Offshoring.” *American Economic Review* 98(5): 1978–97.

Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Keong T. Woo. 2005. “The Impact of Outsourcing to China on Hong Kong’s Labor Market.” *American Economic Review* 95(5): 1673–1687.

Service Trade and Politics

Francois, Joseph and Bernard Hoekman. 2010. “Services Trade and Policy.” *Journal of Economic Literature* 48 (September): 642–692.

WTO. 2010. “Measuring Trade in Services.”

Drake, William J., and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. 1992. “Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: ‘Trade in Services’ and the Uruguay Round.” *International Organization* 46(01): 37–100.

Baccini, Leonardo, Iain Osgood, and Stephen Weymouth. 2019. “The Service Economy: U.S. Trade Coalitions in an Era of Deindustrialization.” *The Review of International Organizations* 14, 261–296.